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REGI-THE APPLICABILITY OF STATUTES OF LIMI-
TATIONS AGAINST THE STATE OF MAINE IN CIVIL
ACTIONS
Sigmund D. Schutz*
I. INTRODUCTION
Did your car scratch a guardrail on a State highway seven years ago?1 Did
you damage a bridge by driving an overweight vehicle over that bridge eight years
ago? 2 Are you the beneficiary of an estate that includes property on which the
State assisted in the clean-up of an oil spill ten years ago?3 States have actually
pursued claims for recovery of damages under these circumstances, where the events
giving rise to the claim are long past.4 Many states, including the State of Maine,
take the position that they have, essentially, an infinite time within which to bring
a civil action.
The basis for the State's claim of immunity from statutes of limitations is the
old English common law doctrine, "nullum tempus occurrit regi"-- literally, no
time runs against the King-which purports to exempt the State from statutes of
limitations of general applicability unless statutes expressly provide otherwise.
There has not been a Maine Supreme Judicial Court (Law Court) opinion mention-
ing the nullum tempus doctrine since 1955, 5 but the doctrine continues to be ac-
tively asserted by the State of Maine in civil actions filed in Superior Court. At
least six Superior Court decisions since 1990 reference the nullum tempus doc-
trine.6
* Attorney, Preti, Flaherty, Beliveau, Pachios & Haley, LLC, Portland, Maine. Mr. Schutz
received a B.A. cum laude from Colby College, and a J.D. from the Cornell University Law
School. The author unsuccessfully argued a motion to dismiss urging abrogation of the nullum
tempus doctrine in State v. Knightly, CV-00-265 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., July 12, 2001)
(Studstrup, J.). The motion was denied, and the case was subsequently settled.
1. The State of Colorado Department of Transportation filed suit against a tractor-trailer
owner for damaging the wall of a tunnel beyond Colorado's two-year statute of limitations for
tort actions. Shootman v. Dept. of Transp., 926 P.2d 1200, 1201 (Colo. 1996) (abrogating nullum
tempus doctrine).
2. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania sued a trucking company for allegedly driving an
overweight vehicle over a bridge, causing damage eight years and four months after the inci-
dent. Dept. of Transp. v. J.W. Bishop & Co., 439 A.2d 101 (Pa. 1981).
3. The State of Maine filed suit against the estate of a sole proprietor of a wholesale and retail
oil distribution business for reimbursement of clean up costs resulting from a ten-year-old petro-
leum spill. State v. Knightly, CV-00-265 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., July 12, 2001) (Studstrup,
J.).
4. See supra notes 1-3.
5. State v. Crommett, 151 Me. 188, 193, 116 A.2d 614, 616 (1955).
6. See State v. Minervino, CV-02-28, slip op. at 2 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., July 5, 2002)
(Studstrup, J.); State v. Knightly, CV-00-265, slip op. at 2 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., July 12,
2001) (Studstrup, J.); Caruso v. State Tax Assessor, CV-99-80, slip op. at 6 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken.
Cty., Nov. 14, 2000) (Marden, J.); Maine Mfd. Hous. Bd. v. Holly Park, Inc., CV-93-599 (Me.
Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., July 25, 1994) (Atwood, J.); State v. Int'l Paper Co., CV-88-47, slip op. at
2 (Me. Super. Ct., Fra. Cty., Sept. 27, 1990) (Fritzsche, J.); State v. Claude Dubois Excavating,
Inc., CV-87-578 (Me. Super. Ct., Yor. Cty., June 4, 1990) (Brennan, J.).
[Vol. 55:2
NULLUM TEMPUS OCCURRIT REGI
It is high time to consider whether the doctrine should remain good law in
Maine. The Law Court abolished common law sovereign immunity from tort claims
in 1976;7 over the last twelve years the high courts of the states of Colorado, 8 New
Jersey,9 and South Carolina10 have abrogated the nullum tempus doctrine, and the
doctrine is ripe for policy reevaluation in light of the split in authority and chang-
ing concepts of justice. Given the not infrequent assertion of the doctrine by the
State of Maine in civil actions, it is only a matter of time before the nullum tempus
doctrine again comes before the Law Court.
This Article analyzes current Maine law on the applicability of statutes of
limitations to the State, specifically whether the nullum tempus doctrine should
remain good law in Maine, and suggests that the doctrine is ripe for abrogation.
Part II presents a survey of the nullum tempus doctrine in Maine, and questions
whether the doctrine survives Maine's generally applicable six-year statute of limi-
tations on all civil actions. Part III argues that the abolition of common law sover-
eign immunity from tort claims in Maine removed the historic underpinning of the
nullum tempus doctrine and its rational justifications. Part IV demonstrates that
the public policies favoring statutes of limitations apply with equivalent force to
both private parties and to the State. Finally, Part V shows the flaws in the stated
policy underlying the nullum tempus doctrine. Immunity from statutes of limita-
tions in all civil actions does not necessarily foster the preservation of public rights,
and may actually undermine an incentive for the state to promptly and efficiently
pursue meritorious actions.
II. THE NULLUM TEMPUS DOCTRINE
The Latin phrase nullum tempus occurrit regi translates as: time does not run
against the king. 11 It was inherited in the United States as part of English common
law. 12 In recent times the phrase has been reconstituted as nullum tempus occurrit
reipublicae, to substitute "state" for "king" in light of the outcome of the American
Revolution. 13 The phrase stands for the doctrine that the State is not bound by a
statute of limitations unless the statute expressly mentions the State by name. 14
There is a split in authority among the states with respect to the doctrine, which
remains the common law or has been codified in some states, but has been abro-
gated by statute or judicial opinion in others. 15 The doctrine remains viable in
7. Davies v. City of Bath, 364 A.2d 1269, 1273 (Me. 1976).
8. City of Colorado Springs v. Timberlane Assoc., 824 P.2d 776, 782-83 (Colo. 1992).
9. New Jersey Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen P'ship, 592 A.2d 559, 561 (N.J. 1991).
10. South Carolina ex rel. Condon v. City of Columbia, 528 S.E.2d 408,413 (S.C. 2000).
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1096 (7th ed. 1999).
12. City of Colorado Springs v. Timberlane Assoc., 824 P.2d at 778 ("The nullum tempus
doctrine was imparted to the colonies as an incident of sovereignty when the colonies achieved
their independence.").
13. See id. at 777-79 (defining nullum tempus as it came to be applied to the states).
14. Id. at 778.
15. See, e.g., Pima County v. State, 850 P.2d 115, 117 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992.) (quoting ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 12-510 (2000)) (Arizona statutes provide, "the state shall not be barred by the
limitations of actions prescribed in this chapter."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.2 (West 2000)
(New Jersey's ten-year limitations period applicable to the State and its subdivisions); State v.
Kermit Lumber & Pressure Treating Co., 488 S.E.2d 901,909 (W. Va. 1997) (citing W.VA. CODE
§ 55-2-19 (1923)) (West Virginia's doctrine of nullum tempus abrogated by statute); City of
Colorado Springs v. Timberlane Assoc., 824 P.2d at 782-83 (abrogating nullum tempus doc-
trine). See also infra Chart I (split in common law authority in six states).
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federal jurisprudence, 16 although its applicability has been limited by federal stat-
utes imposing limitations periods on tort and contract actions, as well as actions
for enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture brought by the federal gov-
ernment. 17
The doctrine historically originated as one of the personal prerogatives of the
King of England, "'justified on the ground that the king was too busy looking after
the welfare of his subjects to sue.' 18 Its modem justification rests on the public
policy that "public remedies, in preserving the public rights, revenues, and prop-
erty, ought not to be lost by the laches of public officers." 19 Justice Story articu-
lated this policy as follows:
The true reason, indeed, why the law has determined, that there can be no negli-
gence or laches imputed to the crown, and, therefore, no delay should bar its
right, though sometimes asserted to be, because the king is always busied for the
public good, and, therefore, has not leisure to assert his right within the times
limited to subjects.. ., is to be found in the great public policy of preserving the
public rights, revenues, and property from injury and loss, by the negligence of
public officers. And though this is sometimes called a prerogative right, it is in
fact nothing more than a reservation, or exception, introduced for the public ben-
efit, and equally applicable to all governments. 20
Based on this policy, some courts have distinguished between actions by the gov-
ernment to preserve proprietary rights from actions to preserve public rights, find-
ing that only the latter are immune from statutes of limitations. 2 1 Likewise, many
16. See, e.g., United States v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co., 118 U.S. 120,
125 (1886); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 344 (1888).
17. In 1966, Congress enacted a general statute of limitations, now found in 28 U.S.C. § 2415
(2000) applicable to most tort (three years) and contract (six years) actions brought by the gov-
ernment or by a federal officer or agency. A separate statute limits the federal government to
five years after accrual within which to bring an action, suit, or proceeding for the enforcement
of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2000).
18. New Jersey Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen P'ship, 592 A.2d 559, 563 (N.J. 1991) (quot-
ing Comment, Developments in the Law--Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1251
(1950)). See also Dept. of Transp. v. J.W. Bishop & Co., 439A.2d 101, 103 (Pa. 1981) (citing 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *247-48).
19. Inhabitants of Topsham v. Blondell, 82 Me. 152, 154, 19A. 93, 94 (1889). See also Dept.
of Transp. v. Sullivan, 527 N.E.2d 798, 799 (Ohio 1988); City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville
Restorium, Inc., 451 N.E.2d 874, 876 (Ill. 1983) ("the doctrine of immunity from statutes of
limitation . . . 'is supported in modem law by the policy judgment that the public should not
suffer because of the negligence of its officers and agents"') (quoting North Dakota ex rel. Bd.
of Univ. & Sch. Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 271, 274 (8th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273 (1983)); City of
Colorado Springs v. Timberlane Assoc., 824 P.2d at 778 ("The contemporary nullum tempus
doctrine is grounded not on notions of royal privilege, but on considerations of public policy.").
20. United States v. Hoar, 26 F Cas. 329, 330 (C.C.D. Mass. 1821) (No. 15,373) (citation
omitted).
21. Champaign County Forest Pres. Dist. v. King, 687 N.E.2d 980, 982, 984 (Ill. 1997)
(holding that the statute of limitations is applicable to a governmental entity suit to recover
excessive liability insurance premiums); Oklahoma City Mun. Improvement Auth. v. HTB, Inc.,
769 P.2d 131, 134 (Okla. 1989) (stating that immunity depends upon whether action is taken in
a sovereign capacity and whether the rights at issue rise to the level of public rights); New Jersey
Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen P'ship, 592 A.2d at 561 (stating that whether "State agencies..
. were acting in a governmental rather than a proprietary capacity... arises from a distinction
that courts have long made in curtailing the doctrine of sovereign immunity") (citations omit-
ted); Caruso v. State Tax Assessor, CV-99-80, slip op. at 7 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., Nov. 14,
2000) (Marden, J.).
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jurisdictions have found that nullum tempus is an attribute of sovereignty only, and
so does not extend to local government.22
A. Maine Common Law
The Law Court has historically recognized the nullum tempus doctrine, often
in the context of adverse possession claims against the State. 23 The doctrine is not
based on any statute or constitutional provision, but rather is a creature of the
common law.24 The most recent reference to the doctrine by the Law Court was in
its 1955 State v. Crommett25 opinion in which the Law Court found that "[a] stat-
ute of limitations does not apply against the State unless the State is expressly
named therein, or in some manner it is specifically so stated."26 Several recent
Superior Court decisions have also referenced the doctrine, 27 Unlike some juris-
dictions that have distinguished between statutes of limitations and statutes of re-
pose,28 the two concepts appear to have merged in Maine,29 rendering nullum
tempus generally applicable to all time limitations on causes of action.
There appears to be a conflict of authority in Maine with respect to whether
municipalities or other institutions of local government can raise the nullum tern-
22. City of Colorado Springs v. Timberlane Assoc., 824 P.2d at 778 ("Some jurisdictions
fully shield their political subdivisions from limitations on actions under the nullum tempus
doctrine, while a minority of jurisdictions have declined to extend the nullum tempus doctrine to
local government."); Dept. of Transp. v. Sullivan, 527 N.E.2d at 800 (holding that nullum tern-
pus does not extend to townships, counties, school districts or boards of education); Oklahoma
City Mun. Improvement Auth. v. HTB, Inc., 769 P.2d at 139 (Opala, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"the ascription of sovereign status to a governmental entity other than the state is a pernicious,
aberrational norm that should today be excised from the body of [Oklahoma] jurisprudence").
23. See In re Meier's Estate, 144 Me. 358, 365-66, 69 A.2d 664, 667-68 (1949); Phinney v.
Gardner, 121 Me. 44,48-49, 115 A. 523, 525 (1921); Inhabitants of Charlotte v. Pembroke Iron-
Works, 82 Me. 391, 393, 19 A. 902, 903 (1890); Inhabitants of Topsham v. Blondell, 82 Me.
152, 154-55, 19 A. 93, 94 (1889); Stetson v. City of Bangor, 73 Me. 357, 359 (1882); cf. United
States v. Burrill, 107 Me. 382, 385-86, 78 A. 568, 569 (1910) ("no title by adverse possession
can be acquired except by statute against the sovereign, be it crown or national government or
state"); Cary v. Whitney, 48 Me. 516, 532 (1860) ("A title cannot be acquired by adverse posses-
sion of the land of the State, whilst the title and property is in the State.").
24. See cases cited supra note 23.
25. 151 Me. 188, 116 A.2d 614 (1955). Crommett was cited by the Law Court in the more
recent case, Jenness v. Nickerson, 637 A.2d 1152, 1158 (Me. 1994) for the proposition that "it is
the general rule in Maine that the State is not bound by a statute unless expressly named therein."
Jenness held that the State is not a "person" as that term is used in the Maine Civil Rights Act,
and, therefore is not subject to suit under the Act. Id.
26. State v. Crommett, 151 Me. at 193, 116A.2d at 616.
27. See cases cited supra note 6.
28. E.g., Smith v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 732 P.2d 466, 468-69 n.ll (Okla. 1987) (distin-
guishing between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose).
29. See Nuccio v. Nuccio, 673 A.2d 1331, 1334 (Me. 1996) ("'Statutes of limitation are
statutes of repose and.., should be construed strictly in favor of the bar which it was intended
to create and not liberally in favor of a promise, acknowledgement or waiver."') (quoting Duddy
v. McDonald, 148 Me. 535, 538, 97 A.2d 445,446 (1953)); State v. Crommett, 151 Me. at 194,
116 A.2d at 617:
The counsel for the defendant in a carefully prepared and comprehensive brief, insists
that this statute of limitation is a statute of "non claim" and cites decisions from some
other jurisdictions to this effect. Statutes of "non claim" not only affect the remedy
but extinguish the right of recovery. Maine is not familiar with this doctrine, under
such a name as against the State, where the State is not specifically referred to.
2003]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
pus shield, or whether the doctrine is limited to the State and its agencies and
instrumentalities. 30 There is also uncertainty with respect to whether Maine dis-
tinguishes actions by the government in its public capacity, from actions in its
proprietary capacity for purposes of the nullum tempus doctrine. 3 1 At least one
Superior Court Judge has found that a determination as to whether the nullum
tempus doctrine applies depends upon the nature of the activity engaged in by the
State. If that activity is purely contractual, then the statute of limitations will be
applicable. 32 The Law Court, however, has yet to address whether the public/
proprietary function distinction is applicable to the nullum tempus doctrine under
Maine law.
B. Maine's Six-Year Statute of Limitations for All Civil Actions
A Maine statute provides for a six-year statute of limitations for all actions
where no other limitations period is specified. The statute provides:
All civil actions shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action
accrues and not afterwards, except actions on a judgment or decree of any court
of record of the United States, or of any state or of a justice of the peace in this
State, and except as otherwise specially provided. 33
This statute was enacted in its present form in 1959, and has not been substantively
amended since.34 Prior versions of the statute listed seven categories of "actions"
subject to statutes of limitations if not commenced within six years after accrual. 35
30. Compare Inhabitants of Charlotte v. Pembroke Iron-Works, 82 Me. 391, 393, 19 A. 902,
903 (1890):
The doctrine that to the sovereign power the maxim, "nullum tempus occurrit regi,"
applies, has long been understood.... Towns and other municipalities are regarded
as public agencies, exercising, in behalf of the state, public duties in the administra-
tion of civil government, and as such are but the auxiliaries of the sovereign power.
with Inhabitants of Topsham v. Blondell, 82 Me. 152, 155, 19 A. 93, 94 (1889) ("[Tjhe over-
whelming weight of authority holds that municipal corporations, even in their public character,
are not so vested with the rights and privileges of sovereignty as to be within the protection of
the maxim nullum tempus, etc.").
31. See Caruso v. State Tax Assessor, CV-99-80, slip op. at 6 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., Nov.
14, 2000) (Marden, J.):
A determination of whether the [nullum tempus] doctrine applies in this case is depen-
dent upon the nature of the activity engaged in by the defendant.... [I]f the activity is
purely contractual, as the plaintiffs aver, the rationale underlying the doctrine would
be best served by enforcing the statute of limitations affirmative defenses against the
defendant [State Tax Assessor], should it apply under the circumstances.
32. Id.
33. 14 M.R.S.A. § 752 (1980).
34. P.L. 1959, ch. 317, § 143 (repealing and replacing R.S., ch. 112, § 90 (1954)). In 1959 the
statute provided in full:
All civil actions shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues
and not afterwards, except actions on a judgment or decree of any court of record of
the United States, or of any state, or a municipal court, trial justice, or justice of the
peace in this State, and except as otherwise specially provided.
Id. The statute was amended in 1963 to eliminate the "municipal court, trial justice or[.]" P.L.
1963, ch. 402, § 170. This was a simplification of the statute given that it is sufficient simply to
reference actions on a judgment or decree of any court of record of any state. A list of the types
of court or justices was not necessary and did not substantively change the statute.
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These earlier statutes did not include the phrases "all civil actions" or "except as
otherwise specially provided."'36 There is no debate or statement of fact attached
to the 1959 legislation and no other explanation of legislative intent has been lo-
cated to explain whether the 1959 changes were meant to effect the nullum tempus
doctrine. Apparently, one reason for the change in the statute's language, how-
ever, was the merger of law and equity, effective December 1, 1959, which created
the need for a limitations period for actions formerly cognizable in equity only.37
Regardless of the Legislature's reasons for the change, the reformulation of stat-
utes of limitations in 1959 introduced substantial new language not found in prior
Maine statutes of limitations.
The six-year "all civil actions" limitations period is subject to interpretation
under the plain meaning rule, which is the first principle of all statutory construc-
tion.38 The term "civil actions" includes all actions "to enforce, redress, or protect
a private or civil right."'39 Any action that is not criminal is a civil action. 40 The
distinction between civil and criminal actions is the only one in the statute, which
notably does not distinguish by the identity or status of the party bringing the
action.4 1 In light of the plain meaning rule, finding that a civil action by the State
is somehow not a "civil action" would be "to indulge in a fantasy."42
The six-year limitations period also provides that civil actions are excepted
only "as otherwise specially provided. ' 4 3 The plain meaning here is that excep-
tions exist only where specifically set forth by statute. There is no Maine statute
that expressly exempts the State from statutes of limitations, and so recognizing an
exception not "otherwise specially provided" would be contrary to the plain mean-
ing rule.
Also useful for interpretation of the six-year "all civil actions" statute of limi-
tations is the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius,44 which holds that the
inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of the others, or of alternatives. 45 The
only two categories of actions excepted on the face of the statute itself are "actions
on a judgment or decree of any court of record of the United States, or of any state
or of a justice of the peace in this State."'46 This listing of certain enumerated
35. R.S. ch. 112, § 90 (1954); R.S. ch. 99, § 90 (1944); R.S. ch. 95, § 90 (1930); R.S. ch. 86,
§ 85 (1916); R.S. ch. 83, § 85 (1904); R.S. ch. 81, § 82 (1884); R.S. ch. 81, § 79 (1871); R.S. ch.
81, § 82 (1857); R.S. ch. 146, § 1 (1847); 1821 Me. Laws LXII.
36. See sources cited supra note 35.
37. See Bowden v. Grindle, 651 A.2d 347, 350 n.1 (Me. 1994).
38. E.g., Merrill v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 2000 ME 16, 11, 745 A.2d 378, 384. ("The
most fundamental rule of statutory construction is the plain meaning rule. When statutory lan-
guage is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to any other rules of statutory con-
struction.").
39. BLACK'S LAW DCTIONARY 30 (7th ed. 1999).
40. Id.
41. See 14 M.R.S.A. § 752 (1980).
42. Dept. of Transp. v. Sullivan, 527 N.E.2d 798, 802 (Ohio 1988) (Brown, J., dissenting).
43. 14 M.R.S.A. § 752.
44. Wescott v. Allstate Ins., 397 A.2d 156, 169 (Me. 1979) ("The maxim-expressio unius est
exclusio alterius-is well recognized in Maine as in other states. It is a handy tool to be used at
times in ascertaining the intention of the lawmaking body.").
45. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 602 (7th ed. 1999).
46. 14 M.R.S.A. § 752.
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exceptions to an otherwise all encompassing statute of limitations is an indication
that the Legislature intended no special treatment for the State.
No Law Court opinion has yet expressly addressed whether Maine's general
six-year statute of limitations applicable to "all civil actions" is trumped by the
nullum tempus doctrine, but two recent Law Court opinions have ignored and are
inconsistent with the doctrine. In the 1987 case, State v. Bob Chambers Ford,
Inc.,47 the Law Court held that a claim brought by the State for violations of the
Unfair Trade Practices Act4 8 was subject to the "all civil actions" six-year limita-
tions period.4 9 The court analyzed whether to apply the general six-year "all civil
actions" limitations period or instead the four-year limitations period for breaches
of warranties. 50 Ultimately, the court held that the six-year limitations period for"all civil actions" applied to the State's claim. 5 1 Presumably, if in fact no limita-
tions period applied at all to the State's action under the nullum tempus doctrine,
the Law Court would neither have reached the thorny question of which limita-
tions period to apply nor would it have applied the six-year statute of limitations.
Another recent Law Court opinion, an appeal by a father of a Department of
Human Services's order that he pay child support and reimburse the Department
for benefits paid to the child's mother, also subjected the State to a statute of limi-
tations of general applicability.5 2 Although the general six-year limitations period
was not at issue, Jack v. Department of Human Services53 involved a statute of
limitations that did not mention the State by name: "[tihe father's liabilities for
past education and necessary support are limited to a period of 6 years next pro-
ceeding the commencement of the action. ' 54 Both the mother and child were
entitled to bring an action for past education and necessary support by statute, 55
but in Jack the claim was brought by the State. Nonetheless, the Law Court held,
"The Department by statute is limited to recovery of past support accrued within 6
years of commencement of the action .... 56 As in the Bob Chambers Ford case,
had the State been free from limitation periods that do not specifically include it,
the court in Jack would, presumably, have refused to hold that the State's claim
was limited to six years.
47. 522 A.2d 362 (Me. 1987).
48. 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 205-A to 214 (2002).
49. State v. Bob Chambers Ford, Inc., 522 A.2d at 364.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Jack v. Dept. of Human Servs., 556 A.2d 1093, 1094-95 (Me. 1989).
53. 556 A.2d 1093 (Me. 1989).
54. 19 M.R.S.A. § 273 (1988) (repealed 1997).
55. 19 M.R.S.A. § 272 (1988) (repealed 1997).
56. Jack v. Dept. of Human Servs., 556 A.2d at 1095.
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I. THE ABOLITION OF COMMON LAW SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN MAINE AND
THE NULLUM TEMPUS DOCTRINE
A. The Abolition of Common Law Sovereign Immunity from Tort Claims in Maine
The Law Court abolished common law sovereign immunity from tort claims 57
in its 1976 decision, Davies v. City of Bath.58 The court held: "We will no longer
dismiss actions in tort brought against the State or its political subdivisions solely
on the basis of governmental immunity." 59 Since Davies, the court has repeatedly
emphasized the effect of the decision: "[W]e held that sovereign immunity would
no longer be a bar to tort actions against the state for causes of action arising on or
after February 1, 1977. ' '60 Davies applied to the particular plaintiff involved, and
was otherwise prospective. 6 1
The Davies opinion abrogated sovereign immunity in the strongest terms. The
court found that it resulted in "substantial injustices[,]" "could no longer be logi-
cally defended[,]" and was "no longer a rational judicial doctrine. '62 Earlier deci-
sions by the Law Court had likewise observed that the doctrine had "served its
usefulness and ought to be destroyed[,] ' '63 was not "a rational legal concept[,]" 64
and was "incorrect and its application cannot withstand the test of logic."'65
Promptly after the Law Court abrogated common law sovereign immunity from
tort claims, the Legislature enacted the Maine Tort Claims Act,66 which restored
57. The common law sovereign immunity from tort claims that was abrogated in Davies, see
infra note 58 and accompanying text, (and replaced by the Maine Tort Claims Act) should not be
confused with the branch of sovereign immunity derived from the Eleventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution, which immunizes states from suit in state court to vindicate federal
rights. Alden v. State, 1998 ME 2000, 8, 715 A.2d 172, 174 (states are immune from suit in
their own courts for violations of federal labor law). The extent to which sovereign immunity
exists with respect to non-tort claims, and the exact scope of sovereign immunity as a whole is
beyond the scope of this Article. However, with respect to contract claims it does appear that,
notwithstanding sovereign immunity, the State is "not free to disregard contracts into which it
has entered ...." KHK Assoc. v. Dept. of Human Servs., 632 A.2d 138, 141 (Me. 1993).
58. 364 A.2d 1269, 1273 (Me. 1976).
59. Id.
60. Brann v. State, 424 A.2d 699, 701 (Me. 1981); see also Noel v. Town of Ogunquit, 555
A.2d 1054, 1056 (Me. 1990) ("Davies abrogat[ed] the defense of sovereign immunity."); Coutu-
rier v. Penobscot Indian Nation, 544 A.2d 306, 309 n.6 (Me. 1988) (noting that Davies "abro-
gated common law sovereign immunity"); Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Inst., 535 A.2d
421, 424 (Me. 1987) (Maine Tort Claims Act enacted "[flollowing our abolition of the common
law doctrine of sovereign immunity"); Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987, 1001 n.14 (Me. 1982)
(noting that Davies "abolished the doctrine of sovereign immunity"); Nadeau v. State, 395 A.2d
107, 111 (Me. 1978) ("sovereign immunity was an absolute bar to a suit against the State prior to
our decision in Davies"); Turner v. Collins, 368 A.2d 1160, 1161 (Me. 1977) (per curiam) ("Sov-
ereign immunity was abrogated by Davies on November 30, 1976.").
61. Davies v. City of Bath, 364 A.2d at 1274. Cases that arose prior to February 1, 1977, such
as Drake v. Smith, 390 A.2d 541 (Me. 1978) (civil action filed on July 28, 1970), were not
entitled to take advantage of the abrogation of sovereign immunity recognized in Davies. The
Drake decision also involved Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits against the State to
vindicate federal rights in state court, not common law immunity. See id. at 546.
62. Davies v. City of Bath, 364 A.2d at 1270, 1272-73.
63. Nelson v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 157 Me. 174, 186, 170 A.2d 687, 693 (1961).
64. Bartashevich v. City of Portland, 308 A.2d 551, 552 (Me. 1973).
65. Bale v. Ryder, 286 A.2d 344, 345 (Me. 1972).
66. 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 8101-8118 (1980 & Supp. 2001).
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aspects of sovereign immunity, but also provided to claimants harmed by activities
within the scope of liability under the Act an opportunity to seek compensation. 67
The Law Court has interpreted the Maine Tort Claims Act as having entirely dis-
placed the common law of sovereign immunity in all respects.6 8
B. Shared Historic Roots
The nullum tempus doctrine shares common historic roots with sovereign im-
munity. Historically, "[t]he nullum tempus doctrine was imported to the colonies
as an incident of sovereignty when the colonies achieved their independence." 69
Sovereign immunity originated, as the Law Court recognized, in the "personal
prerogative of the King of England."'70 Likewise, nullum tempus doctrine "origi-
nated 'as one of the royal prerogatives.' 7 1 Either the King could do no wrong
(rex non potestpeccare), or any wrong done by the King (such as laches) is deemed
to be excusable in light of the greater public good, and, therefore, should not be
prejudicial to the rights of the crown. 72 Sovereign immunity put this principle into
effect by shielding the state from suit, while nullum tempus immunized the state
from the effects of delay in bringing suit in the name of the greater public good.
Considerations of sovereign immunity and nullum tempus were justified on the
principle that "the king established his own rules for litigation. ' '73 Based on the
historical relationship between sovereign immunity and immunity from statutes of
limitations, it appears to be the majority position among those states that have
considered the issue that immunity from statutes of limitations is one facet of the
broader principle of sovereign immunity.74
67. Erickson v. State, 444 A.2d 345, 351 (Me. 1982) (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("It cannot be
denied that the Legislature by enacting the Act acknowledged that fairness requires claimants
harmed by activities within the scope of liability under the Act have a realistic opportunity to
seek compensation.").
68. Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Inst., 535 A.2d 421,424 (Me. 1987) ("the Maine Tort
Claims Act has in this state entirely displaced the common law of sovereign immunity, including
any exceptions to immunity").
69. City of Colorado Springs v. Timberlane Assoc., 824 P.2d 776, 778 (Colo. 1992).
70. Bale v. Ryder, 286 A.2d at 345-46.
71. New Jersey Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen P'ship, 592 A.2d at 562 (quoting Comment,
Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1177, 1251 (1950)); see
also City of Colorado Springs v. Timberlane Assoc., 824 P.2d at 777-78 ("Labelled the royal
prerogative, the rule protected the king when he brought suit in the posture of a plaintiff.");
Dept. of Transp. v. J.W. Bishop & Co., 439 A.2d 101, 103 (Pa. 1981) ("Like the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, the doctrine of nullum tempus appears to have had its roots in the preroga-
tive of the Crown.").
72. City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium, Inc., 451 N.E.2d 874, 876 (I11. 983) ("The
doctrine of, sovereign immunity from suit ... went under the slightly misleading but popular
maxim of 'the King can do no wrong' ("Rex nonpotestpeccare"), from which it was but a slight
jump in logic to conclude that the King could not commit mistakes such as laches either ......
(citations omitted).
73. Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A.2d 199, 202 (N.J. 1991).
74. South Carolina ex rel. Condon v. City of Columbia, 528 S.E.2d 408, 413 (S.C. 2000)
("We find persuasive the reasoning of the New Jersey and Colorado courts, which concluded the
nullum tempus doctrine is but an aspect of sovereign immunity."); Washington Suburban Sani-
tary Comm'n v. Pride Homes, Inc., 435 A.2d 796,801 (Md. 1981) ("the doctrine that limitations
do not run against the State stems from the theory of sovereign immunity"); New Jersey Educ.
Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen P'ship, 592 A.2d at 561 ("nullum tempus is but an aspect of sovereign
immunity"); Shootman v. Dept. of Transp., 926 P.2d 1200, 1205 (Colo. 1996) ("nullum tempus
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Once immunity from statutes of limitations is considered one application of
sovereign immunity, the necessary corollary is that the former must yield once the
later is extinguished. The Supreme Court of South Carolina succinctly held in a
2000 opinion that, "the abolition of the common law doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity signaled the end of the common law doctrine of nullum tempus. ' '7 5 Likewise,
the New Jersey Supreme Court had earlier observed:
[W]e believe that despite its different evolution, the doctrine of nullum tempus is
but an aspect of sovereign immunity. This Court has previously determined that
the doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity, in the areas of the State's
tort and contract liability, does not accord with notions of fundamental justice
applicable to our elected representative form of government.... Having yielded
the greatest aspect of sovereign immunity, immunity from any suit at all, it would
be anomalous in the extreme not to conclude that the sovereign who can now be
sued should not have to bring its own suit in a timely manner.76
In addition to New Jersey and South Carolina, the Colorado Supreme Court con-
curs that once sovereign immunity is abrogated, the nullum tempus doctrine is left
without its historic and logical underpinning and must, therefore, be abrogated. 77
Not all courts agree. The split in authority is summarized in Chart I below,
which reviews those jurisdictions that have considered whether abolition of com-
mon law sovereign immunity is grounds for abrogating the nullum tempus doc-
trine. This split is primarily due to the relative importance placed by these various
courts on the preservation of public rights policy previously outlined in Part II of
this Article as compared to countervailing policy considerations.7 8 Whether the
preservation of public rights is a useful distinction between sovereign immunity
and the nullum tempus doctrine is analyzed below in Part III.D, and the assump-
tion that nullum tempus does in fact foster the preservation of public rights is ques-
tioned in Part V, below.
is simply one aspect of sovereign immunity"); Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405 v. Brazier Constr.
Co., 691 P.2d 178, 186 (Wash. 1984) ("once sovereign immunity was eliminated, the rule of
nullum tempus became inapplicable"); City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium, Inc., 451
N.E.2d at 875-16 ("sovereign immunity from liability and governmental immunity from statutes
of limitation shared a philosophical origin and have the similar effect of creating a preference
for the sovereign over the ordinary citizen"); but see Dept. of Transp. v. J.W. Bishop & Co., 439
A.2d at 104 (finding "the doctrines have been consistently recognized as distinct").
75. South Carolina ex rel. Condon v. City of Columbia, 528 S.E.2d at 413.
76. New Jersey Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen P'ship, 592 A.2d at 561 (citations omitted).
77. Shootman v. Dept. of Transp., 926 P.2d at 1205 ("the nullum tempus doctrine as applied
to the State was left with few underpinnings after we both abrogated sovereign immunity in
relation to the State ... and determined that nullum tempus is simply one aspect of sovereign
immunity") (citations omitted).
78. The polity weight of the preservation of public rights rationale is discussed, infra, in Part
IV of this Article. The countervailing policy implications of the nullum tempus doctrine are
reviewed in detail, infra, in Parts If.C, Il.D, and IV of this Article.
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Chart 1
State Appeals Court Decisions Considering the Effect of the Abolition of
Common Law Sovereign Immunity on Continued Viability of Nullum
Tempus Doctrine79
State Does Abrogation of Year Notes
Common Law Sovereign
Immunity Eliminate
Nullum Tempus?
Colorado80  Yes 1991, Unanimous Decisions.
1996 .
Illinois 81  No 1983, One judge filed a strong
1989 dissenting opinion in 1983.
New Jersey 82  Yes 1991 Unanimous Decisions.
Ohio83  No 1988 A six judge panel of the
Court affirmed, but two
judges dissented and the
concurring Judge filed an
opionion expressing
personal reservations
concerning the policy
behind nullum tempus.
Pennsylvania 84  No 1981 Unanimous decision
reversing decision
abrogating nullum
tempus by intermediate
court of appeals.
South Carolina85  Yes 2000 Unanimous decision.
C. Shared Unjust Effects
Just as common law sovereign immunity was found to be unjust by the Law
Court,86 the nullum tempus doctrine likewise has grossly inequitable and unjust
79. This chart is limited to those reported cases that have decided whether the court's abroga-
tion of common law sovereign immunity heralds the elimination of the nullum tempus doctrine.
80. Shootman v. Dept. of Transp., 926 P.2d at 1203; City of Colorado Springs v. Timberlane
Assoc., 824 P.2d 776, 782-83 (Colo. 1992).
81. City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium, Inc., 451 N.E.2d 874, 878 (I11.1983); Bd. of
Educ. of Chi. v. A, C & S, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 580, 600-02 (III. 1989).
82. New Jersey Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen P'ship, 592 A.2d 559, 564 (N.J. 1991) (hold-
ing nullum tempus not applicable to contract claims); Holloway v. State, 593 A.2d 716 (N.J.
1991) (holding nullum tempus not applicable to tort claims based on subrogation).
83. Dept. of Transp. v. Sullivan, 527 N.E.2d 798 (Ohio 1998).
84. Dept. of Transp. v. J.W. Bishop & Co., 439 A.2d 101 (Pa. 1981).
85. South Carolina ex rel. Condon v. City of Columbia, 528 S.E.2d 408 (S.C. 2000).
86. See discussion supra Part III.A; see also New Jersey Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen
P'ship, 592 A.2d at 561 ("the doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity, in the areas of
the State's tort and contract liability, does not accord with notions of fundamental justice appli-
cable to our elected representative form of government").
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effects. At a basic level, it is unfair for the government to have the ability to raise
the defense of improper delay against a citizen suing it, while a citizen being sued
by the government cannot do so.87 If statutes of limitations are thought to be fair
when applied to citizens, in a democracy there is little reason why it would be
unfair to apply them to the government. Both the government and citizens gener-
ally must play by the same rules when prosecuting or defending civil actions, in-
cluding with respect to pleadings, evidence, depositions, judgment, trial proce-
dure, rights to appeal, and other statues governing the maintenance of civil ac-
tions. 88
The fundamental injustice caused by the nullum tempus doctrine is that it ren-
ders the public forever vulnerable to a suit by the State for long past conduct or
omissions. The decision when to pursue an action is left to the unfettered discre-
tion of the State. Even where the State chooses to delay, with full knowledge of a
claim, and for no good reason, the nullum tempus doctrine gives it free reign to do
so. In cases where civil penalties assessed on a per day basis are available, the
State's delay 'in asserting a claim may greatly enhance potential liability. 89 The
government is also free to sue after witnesses or information useful for defense
may be dead and gone.90 This allows the State to wait until a citizen becomes
defenseless to pursue an action. For example, a suit could be brought after a cru-
cial witness for the defense has died, or evidence has disappeared. Although there
are procedures for the preservation of testimony, there may be little incentive for
undertaking the significant efforts to do so based on speculation that the State
could at some distant point in the future pursue a claim based on long ago conduct.
This is not a hypothetical concern. In the recent case of State v. Knightly,9 1
the State of Maine filed a claim against the Special Administrator of the Estate of
the sole proprietor of a wholesale and retail oil distribution business to recoup
costs spent cleaning up an oil spill. 92 The oil spill was discovered ten years prior
to the filing of a claim, and shortly after discovery of the spill the State began to
incur expenses it would later claim as reimbursable. The deceased sole proprietor
of that business was the hands-on operator of the business, and would have been a
key witness and a crucial source of the information required to defend the claim. It
was plainly unjust for the State to have filed suit ten years after the discovery of
the spill, years after it had expended all or most of the costs later claimed for
reimbursement, and after the operator of the business was deceased and no longer
able to testify or locate insurance or other documentary evidence. Yet, the nullum
tempus doctrine countenances this practice. This is similar to the sort of brazen
injustice that led the Law Court to abrogate sovereign immunity in the first place.
87. City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium, Inc., 481 N.E.2d 874, 879 (111. 1983) (Clark,
J., dissenting).
88. Dept. of Transp. v. Sullivan, 527 N.E.2d at 802 (Brown, J., dissenting).
89. See, e.g., 38 M.R.S.A. § 349(2) (2001) (authorizing penalties of between $100 and $25,000
per day); Town of Orono v. LaPointe, 1997 ME 185, 12, 698 A.2d 1059, 1062 (imposing
minimum $100 per day penalty to violation lasting 730 days).
90. In expressing "personal reservations concerning the public policy considerations under-
lying [the nullum tempus doctrine,]" an Ohio Supreme Court Justice wrote, "I am not enamored
with the notion that the state may sue at its leisure while some taxpayer's records draw dust and
his or'her witnesses' memories fade." Dept. of Transp. v. Sullivan, 527 N.E.2d at 801 (Wright,
J., concurring).
91. CV-00-265 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., July 12, 2001) (Studstrup, J.).
92. Id. slip op. at 1-2.
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It is also unjust for the State to have the right to pursue a claim against a
private party whose own right to pursue a counterclaim or a third-party claim may
long have expired. The State may, in some circumstances, be entitled to assert the
statute of limitations as a defense to a counterclaim when the State's own claim
survives only by virtue of the nullum tempus doctrine. Third-party claims for
contribution, indemnification, or other third-party actions might once have been
available to cover some or all of the liability flowing from a claim by the State, but
may be subject to generally applicable limitations periods in some circumstances,
or otherwise unavailable because a party might have been insured under a claims-
made insurance policy, and might once have had the opportunity to file a claim. A
party that is sued for tax liability, for example, might once have been in a position
to pursue claims against third-parties jointly liable for the tax but now bankrupt,
dead, or otherwise unavailable.
In fact, in the case of Caruso v. State Tax Assessor93 this was exactly the
circumstance. The defendant was the guarantor of a third party's tax liability.9 4
That third party had been a substantial functional business for approximately six
years after the guarantee had been granted, but thereafter went bankrupt. 95 Be-
cause the State pursued its claim against the guarantor only after the underlying
debtor became unavailable and the bankruptcy estate was closed, the State elimi-
nated the guarantor's ability to pursue claims against third parties for the debt.9 6
Although the guarantor was successful in achieving the dismissal of the State's
claims because the claims were purely contractual, the guarantor was at a substan-
tial disadvantage as a result of the State's delay.97 It is unjust and unfairly prejudi-
cial for the State's delay to cause a private party to lose otherwise available oppor-
tunities to share with or pass liability on to third parties.
The nullum tempus doctrine also operates without regard to culpability. The
criminal code protects intentional, even violent, wrongdoers from prosecution af-
ter a defined time period set by statutes of limitations.9 8 By contrast, persons who
may only be negligent or even strictly liable without regard to intent, are forever
subject to a civil suit. It is unjust for someone who is criminally culpable to have
the benefit of a statute of limitations, but for someone who exercised due care but
may be strictly liable, for example, to be completely exposed, forever, to a claim
by the State. Presumably, the law should favor a more lengthy pursuit of those
who are more culpable.
There may be some instances where the abolition of the nullum tempus doc-
trine could prevent the government from taking up the cause of citizens who share
a public right and are unable to bring suit on their own behalf.9 9 To the extent that
the government may sue on behalf of citizens, however, such actions maybe deemed
more in the nature of private suits and therefore outside the protection of the nullum
tempus doctrine. There may also be instances where it would be contrary to the
public interest and would be difficult for the public to protect that interest if stat-
93. CV-99-80 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., Nov. 14, 2000) (Marden, J.).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 8 (1983 & Supp. 2000).
99. City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville Restorium, Inc., 451 N.E.2d 874, 877 (I11. 1983).
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utes of limitations applied. For example, the State may have a difficult time assert-
ing rights with respect to the huge tracts of land it owns, and the public may have
a great interest in protecting that land. Such cases might require a different weigh-
ing of the competing policies at issue than would be the case for a more routine
action by the State to collect damages. Exceptional circumstances should not,
however, countenance a policy that, when applied in routine matters, is unjust.
D. Shared Applicability of the "Preservation of Public Rights" Rationale
Some courts have distinguished sovereign immunity from the nullum tempus
doctrine on the grounds that only the latter is justified on the basis that it preserves
public rights. 100 The "preservation of public rights" policy rationale for the nullum
tempus doctrine, however, is in many respects equally applicable to both sover-
eign immunity and the nullum tempus doctrine. While common law sovereign
immunity is more broadly applicable, the preservation of the public rights ratio-
nale "would serve as well to reinstate the doctrine of governmental immunity from
all claims" 10 1 as it would to support the continued vitality of the nullum tempus
doctrine:
If the State has immunity when its employee forgets a deadline for filing of a
claim, then why should the State not have immunity when its employee forgets to
engage the emergency brake of a truck, allowing the truck to drive into another's
living room? After all, the public in both instances pays the price for the
employee's neglect. 102
Under both doctrines, the public ultimately bears the price of official neglect. 10 3
Sovereign immunity operated to prevent the government from paying damages,
while, similarly, without nullum tempus the government can be time-barred from
collecting danages. From the State's perspective, the inability to collect damages
has the same effect as the obligation to pay damages. In either case, taxpayers
suffer. From the public's perspective, a person's obligation to pay damages may
be as devastating as a person's inability to collect damages. An obligation to pay
and an inability to collect are, at least financially, two sides of the same coin. In
light of the applicability of the preservation of public rights justification to both
sovereign immunity and nullum tempus, there is little reason why the rationale
should have sufficient force to support the continued viability of the nullum tem-
pus doctrine! when it could not sustain the broader and more widely applicable
doctrine of common law sovereign immunity.
100. The Illinois Supreme Court found that nullum tempus "is designed to preserve public
rights when the government is slow to assert them on the public's behalf, while [sovereign
immunity] is used to promote the autonomy of public bodies by insulating them from liability
for their actions." Id.; see also Dept. of Transp. v. J.W. Bishop & Co., 439 A.2d 101, 104 (Pa.
1981).
101. New Jersey Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen P'ship, 592 A.2d 559, 564 (N.J. 1991).
102. Id.
103. Id.; see also Shootman v. Dept. of Transp., 926 P.2d 1200, 1206 n.8 (Colo. 1996) ("Both
liability avoidance and public rights preservation, however, provide protection for the public
fisc. We are not persuaded that the distinction supplies an adequate basis in policy to justify
retaining nullum tempus while rejecting sovereign immunity."); City of Shelbyville v. Shelbyville
Restorium, Inc., 451 N.E.2d at 876 (holding that "both doctrines ... embody[ I a policy of
protecting the public purse rather than as perpetuating philosophical notions of sovereign power").
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IV. APPLICABILITY OF POLICIES UNDERLYING STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS TO
CLAIMS BY THE STATE
The Law Court has recognized that statutes of limitations further a number of
compelling public policies. Statutes of limitations "have been created primarily
for the purpose of keeping 'stale' claims out of court .... a policy favoring poten-
tial defendants who 'might otherwise be faced for long periods with the possibility
of meeting claims under more difficult conditions.' 104 Statutes of limitations
allow parties to rely on a settled state of affairs, and foster stability in human af-
fairs. 105 "[S]tatutes of limitation promote justice by discouraging long delays,
prohibiting the prosecution of stale claims, and providing closure to the parties."1 06
Limitation periods also provide an incentive for reasonably prompt investigation
of claims and potential wrongdoing. 107 The fact is that meritorious claims are not
often allowed to gather dust.
The policy reasons for applying statutes of limitations to private citizens ap-
ply with equal force in favor of applying limitation periods to the State. 10 8 The
Supreme Court of South Carolina stated its finding on this score as follows:
[W]e find that applying the... statute of limitations to the State as well as private
individuals is proper because such statutes are designed to promote justice by
forcing parties to pursue a case in a timely manner. Parties should act before
memories dim, evidence grows stale or becomes nonexistent, or other people act
in reliance on what they believe is a settled state of public affairs. "Statutes of
limitations embody important public policy considerations in that they stimulate
activity, punish negligence, and promote repose by giving security and stability
to human affairs. One purpose of the statute of limitations is to relieve the courts
of the burden of trying stale claims when a plaintiff has slept on his rights. An-
other purpose ... is to protect potential defendants from the protracted fear of
litigation .. " These principles ring true regardless of whether the party is a
private individual, a corporation or a governmental entity. 109
Evidence needed for a claim brought by the State is not magically better pre-
served than evidence needed for a private party's claim. The courts are no less
burdened by a stale claim brought by the State than by a private citizen. There is
no reason why the State should not have the same incentives that citizens have to
promptly and diligently protect its rights. There is nothing special about state
claims per se that make them more difficult for the State to timely bring them.
104. Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 342 A.2d 712, 713 (Me. 1975) (citation omitted) (quoting
Tantish v. Szendey, 158 Me. 228, 230-31, 182 A.2d 660, 661 (1962)).
105. Oklahoma City Mun. Improvement Auth. v. HTB, Inc., 769 P.2d 131, 141-142 (Okla.
1988) (Opala, J., dissenting).
106. Shootman v. Dept. of Transp., 926 P.2d at 1207.
107. Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987, 994 (Me. 1982) (limitation periods are intended to"stimulate activity"); cf. State v. Gammon, 519 A.2d 721,722 (Me. 1987) (limitation periods are
"justified... by the need to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against stale
charges and by the need to provide an incentive for reasonably prompt investigation of criminal
activity").
108. Shootman v. Dept. of Transp., 926 P.2d at 1206 ("the policies underlying statutes of
limitation support application of those limitations to the State").
109. South Carolina ex rel. Condon v. City of Columbia, 528 S.E.2d 408,413-14 (S.C. 2000)
(citation omitted) (quoting Moates v. Bobb, 470 S.E.2d 402,404 (S.C. Ct. App. 1996)); see also
Metro. R.R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U.S. 1, 11 (1889) ("It is just as much for the public
interest and tranquility that municipal corporations should be limited in the time of bringing
suits as that individuals or private corporations should be.").
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People will rely on what they believe is a settled state of affairs without respect to
potential liability for long past events involving the government. In sum, the rea-
sons for applying statutes of limitations to claims by private citizens counsel with
equivalent force in favor of applying limitations to the State.
V. WHETHER THE NULLUM TEMPUS DOCTRINE PRESERVES PUBLIC RIGHTS
As noted, the primary justification for the nullum tempus doctrine is to pre-
serve public rights for the benefit of all. 110 Although there is apparently no em-
pirical evidence on the subject, a number of courts, starting with Justice Story,'11
have accepted this notion at face value. On closer examination, there are serious
questions whether the nullum tempus doctrine actually does foster the preservation
of public rights. In response to a majority opinion affirming the application of the
nullum tempus doctrine in Ohio, one dissenting Justice wrote:
The majority, in its laudable aim of protecting the public purse, has, it seems to
me, misread human nature and the bureaucratic process. Inviting the state to
dally without limitation in the pursuit of revenues or public rights is not likely to
produce better results than would be achieved by requiring the state to proceed as
expeditiously as every other civil litigant. "12
In short, shielding the government from an incentive to investigate claims dili-
gently and to proceed promptly is not necessarily the best way to protect public
rights. Longer delay before asserting a claim often makes it more difficult to suc-
ceed. 113 Defendants become unable to pay, go bankrupt, dissolve, disappear, or
otherwise become unavailable. In addition, modem information technology and
centralized government should allow superior collection and management of in-
formation, including deadlines, than would have been the case when the nullum
tempus doctrine was first imported to colonial America from England. 114 It may
well be that the effect of the nullum tempus doctrine is exactly the opposite of that
which is intended.
VI. CONCLUSION
The nullum tempus doctrine is ripe for abrogation in the State of Maine. The
doctrine is inconsistent with the plain language of Maine's six-year limitation pe-
riod for "all civil actions." It would also be incongruous for the doctrine to survive
the Law Court's abrogation of sovereign immunity, which undercut its historical
foundation and rational justifications. The same injustice that led the court to
abrogate sovereign immunity lives on in nullum tempus. The doctrine is contrary
to the good reasons for having any statute of limitations. In the end, the doctrine
may not actually do much to preserve public rights given that it removes an incen-
tive for the government to act promptly to investigate and pursue its claims. At
110. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
112. Dept. of Transp. v. Sullivan, 527 N.E.2d 798, 802 (Ohio 1988) (Brown, J., dissenting).
113. Of course, certain situations may warrant a delay in pursuing a claim. This is not a
justification for the nullum tempus doctrine given that straightforward tolling agreements, stays,
and other mechanisms exist to allow a conscious choice to delay the filing of an action, or to
suspend an action once filed.
114. See Dept. of Transp. v. Sullivan, 527 N.E.2d at 801 (Wright, J., concurring).
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least three state high courts have abrogated the nullum tempus doctrine for these
reasons. 115
Given the split in authority in those states where common law sovereign im-
munity has been abrogated and nullum tempus remains a creature of the common
law and the reasoning of those courts, 116 it is clear that whether to retain the doc-
trine is a policy judgment. The Law Court should not defer to the Legislature.
Referring to the common law, the Law Court has recognized "its responsibility to
tend to the care and pruning of the perennials of its own garden." 117 The court has
stated:
[WIhere change is required due to obsolescence in court-made rules of law, and
where such change may create lacunae in the legal matrix which the Legislature
is peculiarly well-equipped to address, the surest and swiftest means to assure
progress is for common-law judges to confidently act on their responsibility to
abrogate their own work product when reason proves its invalidity. 118
In light of this principle the court has time and again acted forcefully to eliminate
anachronisms of the common law, including common law sovereign immunity
itself. 119 The court is not bound to hold blindly to out-dated precedent. It should
not leave the citizens of this state at the mercy of the nullum tempus doctrine.
115. See supra notes 80, 82, 85, and Chart I.
116. See supra notes 80, 82, 85, and Chart I.
117. Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987, 992 n.6 (Me. 1982).
118. Id. at 993 n.6; see also Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932, 935 (Me. 1982)
("When principles fail to produce just results, [we have] found a departure from precedent nec-
essary to fulfill [our] role of reasoned decision making."); Pendexter v. Pendexter, 363 A.2d
743,749 (Me. 1976):
The genius of the common law is its flexibility and capacity for growth and adapta-
tion. When common-law principles are no longer supportable in reason they are no
longer supportable in fact.... It is fundamental that the rules of common law which
are court-made rules can be changed by the court when it becomes convinced that the
policies upon which they are based have lost their validity or were mistakenly con-
ceived.
(citation omitted).
119. See, e.g., LaBier v. Pelletier, 665 A.2d 1013, 1016 (Me. 1995) (rejecting the common
law doctrine of imputed parental negligence as "'not only unsound, but absurd and inhuman"')
(quoting Denver City Tramway v. Brown, 143 P.2d 364, 368 (Colo. 1914)); MacDonald v.
MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71, 75 (Me. 1980) (abolishing the doctrine of interspousal immunity);
Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 639-40 (Me. 1979) (abolishing doctrine of parental immunity);
Poulin v. Colby Coll., 402 A.2d 846, 851 (Me. 1979) (abolishing distinction between licensees
and invitees and holding that "an owner or occupier of land owes the same duty of reasonable
care in all the circumstances to all persons lawfully on the land"); Davies v. City of Bath, 364
A.2d 1269, 1273 (Me. 1976); Pendexter v. Pendexter, 363 A.2d at 750 ("[T]he old common-law
rule that the father is primarily liable for the support of his children without regard to the mother's
earnings and assets is outmoded and must be updated."); see also Comment, The Role of the
Maine Law Court in Abrogating the Common Law Doctrines of Governmental and Charitable
Immunity from Tort Liability, 25 ME. L. REV. 359 (1973).
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